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1. The vantage of the Golan Heights: The emancipatory potential of rural resistance 
At an altitude of 1200 metres, the Golan Heights connect Syria, Lebanon, and Israel. The rural and 
mountainous landscape is verdant and fertile, internationally renowned for the excellent quality of its 
apples, cherries and vines. It has a rich supply of freshwater and recently discovered reserves of oil 
and gas. But the Golan Heights is also a place of occupation, protracted conflict, and resistance. 
Occupied by Israel since the 1967 war, the Golan Heights were illegally and unilaterally annexed to 
Israel in 1981. The Israeli occupation displaced, forcefully transferred and affected a total Syrian 
population of 126,879, destroying 340 villages and farms. Today, only five Syrian villages remain in 
the Golan Heights, with a population of 24,505.1 The remaining Syrian population has repeatedly 
denied ‘offers’ of Israeli citizenship and are internationally recognised as stateless,2 they have no 
passports but ‘travel documents’ and, in these documents, nationality is ‘undefined.’ 
Although prior to the occupation the Golan Heights were home to a multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
mixture of Syrians (Mara’i and Halabi 1992), most of the stateless Syrians living there today belong to 
the Druze faith. Dispersed in the Levant, the Druze are an esoteric, endogamous, and non-proselytising 
religious community  (Kastrinou, 2016). With historical roots dating to the 11th century Ismaili branch 
of Shia Islam, they are estimated to be a million people worldwide, mainly in  Syria, Lebanon, Jordan 
and Israel. Their strong religious adherence, however, does not translate into transnational uniformity 
in their political affiliations. On the contrary, the Druze are valorised as nationalists within their 
respective nation-states: for example, as leaders of the nationalist Syrian revolt against the French 
Mandate in 1925, as the only Arabs ‘to be trusted’ and to serve in the Israeli army, and as the 
‘kingmakers’ in the confessional politics of Lebanon. Yet, at a time where the war in Syria is 
reinforcing religious and sectarian identities across the Middle East, the stateless Syrian Druze of the 
Golan Heights find themselves between their identities as Syrian and as Druze. As al-Nusra dominated 
rebel forces control the Syrian borderland, and as Israeli intervention in both Syria and in the Golan is 
becoming increasingly aggressive, the future of the native stateless Syrian Druze of the Occupied 
Golan Heights (hereinafter, SDOGH) looks increasingly uncertain.  
Whilst the Israeli occupation has involved wholesale dispossession of Syrians from their land, 
including forced evictions and ethnic cleansing (Gordon and Ram 2016), as well as settlement 
programmes and acquisition of resources (such as freshwater and common land pastures), Israel has 
also used a very particular idea of the land, and the Golan landscape as part of its appropriation of the 
Golan Heights. That landscape idea represents the Golan Heights as Israel’s amazing ‘wild west,’ a 
land of remarkable natural beauty, steeped in history, in need of protection and home to Israel’s only 
ski resort. Currently, the Golan Heights is home to 22,204 Israelis in 34 settlements. Moreover, Israel 
has used sectarian propaganda in order to weaken the national resistance movement among the 
occupied Syrians. As the stateless Syrians are predominantly members of the Druze religious 
community, Israel has continuously ‘played the sectarian card’: to impose a particularist sectarian 
                                                 
1
 For the most up-to-date compilation of affected villages, people and farms, see map by Brik, N. (2017). ‘Map 
of Syrian villages and farms destroyed by Israel, and the Israeli settlements built in their place, in the Occupied 
Syrian Golan’, URL: http://golan-marsad.org/wp-content/uploads/Map-english-24.1-2.compressed.pdf 
(Accessed 18/1/2018); also see: Murphy & Gannon 2008.  
2
 The international legal definition of a stateless person employed by the UN is the following: “a person who is 
not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law”.  
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identity as a way of obliterating Syrian and Arab nationalism in amongst the occupied population. 
While this strategy had been relatively successful among the Israeli Druze population (Firro 1999; 
Kananeh 2008), it has backfired in relation to the SDOGH, who continue to defy Israeli occupation 
and the sectarianisation of their identity. Could the struggle against Israeli occupation within this rural 
vantage on the Middle East offer new insights into the emancipatory potential of agrarian and land-
based political movements? 
With recourse to history and ethnography, we address the above question by exploring how and why 
the SDOGH stayed and resisted the occupation and subsequently chose to remain stateless. By way of 
explanation, we argue for a unique combination of 1) historical circumstance, 2) an economic-
political-religious-cultural value in and attachment to the land, and 3) the simultaneous condition of 
being stateless and territorially rooted. These three factors help us understand how the SDOGH do not 
fit the current mould of a rural populace that is easily swayed by authoritarian populism. Neither do 
they fit the mould of ‘statelessness’ as a ‘condition of infinite danger’ (Walzer 1983, cited in 
Neocleous 2003: 109). This understanding allows us to see why the SDOGH, on the contrary, have an 
emancipatory positioning vis-a-vis the states of both Israel and Syria. Throughout the paper we 
illustrate how the SDOGH are able to mobilise a counter-hegemonic narrative by virtue of the 
legitimacy their intimate relation to the land affords them. 
Firstly, we provide a brief note on research methodology. Secondly, we set out the theoretical 
premises of our paper, namely that sectarian identity politics in the Middle East can and should be 
looked at through the lens of the current conjuncture of authoritarian populism. This allows us to pay 
special attention to the local context of the Syrian war and the emboldening of right wing politics in 
Israel, but also to interrogate sectarian propaganda as part of a global authoritarian narrative structure. 
Thirdly, we provide an in-depth analysis of the material and ideational struggles over land and 
landscape in the Golan Heights. We conclude by discussing how both attachment to the land as well as 
the condition of statelessness have afforded the native Syrians a vantage point to resist and emancipate 
and what lessons this may offer for rural political struggles in the Middle East and beyond. 
 
2. Methodology and ethics 
The views and arguments expressed in this paper result from the collaboration and synergies between 
Salman Fakher Al-Deen, who is a local activist and researcher who has dedicated his life to the cause 
of Golan resistance, and two academics, a political anthropologist and a rural geographer. Maria 
Kastrinou is a political anthropologist who has conducted extended fieldwork with Druze and stateless 
Syrians in Syria since 2008 (Kastrinou 2012; Kastrinou 2016), and more recently, in 2015, in the 
occupied Golan Heights. Steven Emery, is a rural geographer who has worked extensively on the 
prospects and politics of agricultural cooperation within the context of Food Sovereignty and struggles 
for autonomy, as well as the politics of landscape (Stock et al., 2014; Emery, 2015; Emery and 
Carrithers, 2016; Emery et al., 2017). This work is based primarily upon 10 interviews conducted by 
and with Salman Fakher Al-Deen, and funded through the Emancipatory Rural Politics Initiative 
small grants scheme. The selection of interviewees was made by Salman, following discussions and 
deliberations regarding the aims and desired outcomes of the project. In this way, our sampling was 
not ‘random’ but relied on Salman’s intimate local knowledge. Like in all ethnographies, this method 
inevitably carries along the subjectivist bias of its researchers, however, it is far more embedded and 
nuanced to local sensitivities and relevant frames of reference than more formal methods. Most of the 
Syrians in the occupied villages own some land, but there is huge variety from individual gardens (1-2 
dunums),3 to larger agricultural holdings (30 dunums). For the purposes of this research topic, most of 
our interviewees (6) were active farmers and members of agricultural cooperatives, some of whom had 
been partially dispossessed by the occupation. Only two of our interviewees had no family land, whilst 
two interviewees had smaller pieces of family land that were used for subsistence and recreation. All 
                                                 
3 One dunum is equal to 0.1 Hectare. 
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our interviewees had first-hand memories of the war and subsequent occupation, and their ages ranged 
from 50-80 years. They were residents of Majdal Shams (9) and Buqata (1). Ethnographic insights 
from fieldwork conducted on both sides of the Syrian border, dating between 2008 and 2015 
(including more than 30 interviews conducted over a period of one month in Majdal Shams in 
November 2015), have been indispensable in contextualising, embedding and analysing the interview 
material within historical, cultural and socio-political context. Working through local contacts for the 
conduct of the interviews has meant that issues of intersubjectivity have affected both who the 
interview participants were and the interview itself. To delineate social and political contexts and 
relationships, extensive exchanges between the two academics and Salman have taken place. The 
Golan Heights has been the ‘forgotten occupation (Wingfield 2013), and in this direction, all the 
voices are important.  
Lastly, as academics it is imperative to respect the wishes of our interlocutors upon whose time, trust 
and rapport our research is based. In this direction, we will not be referring to the stateless Syrians in 
the Golan Heights simply as ‘Druze,’ because this is part of the politicised sectarian propaganda that 
we will critically interrogate; but also because most of our interlocutors choose to self-identify as 
native Syrians. In respecting their wishes, and for reasons of political correctness, clarity and 
consistency we will refer to them as the native Syrians of the Occupied Golan Heights (SOGH). 
However, when talking specifically about the religious group, and cultural history we will furnish the 
acronym with a ‘D’ - SDOGH. 
 
3. Authoritarian populism and its connection to sectarianism in the Middle East 
From Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, to Latin America and South Africa, Scoones et al. 
(2017) invite us to rethink the current conjuncture in global politics through the lens of authoritarian 
populism. Research on authoritarian populism (hereinafter AP) aims toward a new synthesis capable 
of analysing complex and often contradictory phenomena associated with an apparent rise of diverse 
forms of authoritarianism (Arendt 1973) and populism (Laclau 2005), and/or authoritarian rhetoric 
even within, but not exclusively in, so-called ‘social democratic’ late capitalist contexts (Scoones et 
al., 2017: 2). We take AP as both politics and strategy: as a politics, AP calls into force different but 
unitary and exclusionist imaginaries of ‘a people,’ evoking and erecting exclusionary boundaries 
through binary opposites of Us and Others. As a strategy, it is a form of demagogy, associated with 
‘moral panics’, and as such it is a way of understanding the hegemonic project of forming, assembling 
and rallying the ‘masses’. Historically, the term comes from an attempt to understand Thatcherite 
Britain, and carries with it the political struggles and debates for  an appropriate response within 
British labour and the left (Hall 1980, 1985; Hall & Jacques 1983; cf. Jessop et al 1984). Indeed, Hall 
(1985) himself had cautioned against the generalizability of AP beyond that specific historical 
conjuncture. However, following Scoones et al., AP can offer an interesting frame to work out how 
state hegemonic projects (Hall 1986) reach and are resisted by rural populations. Moreover, this is a 
valuable comparative project precisely because this is a time of global capitalist hegemony, 
characterised by perpetual and deepening economic recession, brutal imperialist wars, and the decline 
of labour movements across the world. This framework, then, allows for the global juxtaposition and 
exploration of diverse forms of exploitation, resistance as well as emancipation. 
To what extent is AP useful in understanding the current conjuncture in the Middle East, especially in 
interrogating the reach of state hegemony upon rural populations? We are drawn to both the 
explanatory as well as the comparative potential of this project — the latter especially important in 
combating the exceptionalist and Orientalist analyses that imbue regional studies of/in/on the Middle 
East.4 In this section, we delineate how we use AP in ways that are instrumental in understanding rural 
resistance in the Golan Heights. These ways, sketched here, are the connections of AP with (1) 
sectarianism; and (2) the emancipatory potential of rural resistance.  
                                                 
4
 See the following for some recent examples of ap analysis in relation to the Middle East (Ansari 2014), and 
about Muslims (Bari 2016).  
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As a politics, AP is intrinsically interconnected with the hegemonic project of making and using 
exclusionary identity boundaries. Sectarianism, then, could be considered as a variant of AP, since it 
serves to create and manipulate political identities on the basis of sub-political and/or religious 
identities. Following Makdisi (2000) and Kastrinou (2016), we understand sectarianism to be both a 
discourse and a practice. In this paper, we specifically explore the instrumentalist use of sectarianism 
as a political hegemonic project through the associated discourses it produces. In this direction, we are 
not taking for granted ‘sectarianism’ as the ‘natural’ way of ME politics (Van Dam 2011), but aim to 
focus on the political uses and manipulations of sectarianism as a discourse, and as a hegemonic 
project, from above.  
Specifically, connecting sectarianism to AP, we wish to interrogate how the SOGH have managed to 
retain their rootedness in the land, and also to eschew the enveloping authoritarian and populist 
rhetorics of sectarianism from both Israel and Syria. Towards this goal, the following sections outline 
the political and historical contexts for sectarianism-cum-authoritarianism in the region. 
3.1 Between Syria’s imperial sectarianism and Israel’s Druze particularism 
As nation-states erode, frontiers shift, and new populist religious politics rupture the normative 
dictatorial grasp of entrenched regimes and fragile Middle Eastern states, the Druze, like other 
religious minorities, find themselves paradoxically situated between the promise of authoritarian 
protection and the threat of majoritarian marginalisation, or even extinction. Specifically, the war in 
Syria has eroded the previously cosmopolitan state narrative that manipulated a de-politicised form of 
cultural heterogeneity in order to establish itself as the guarantor of harmony and social peace. 
Kastrinou calls this form of sectarianism ‘imperial sectarianism,’ because the state uses an imperial 
rather than ‘nationalist’ ideology that emphasises state-sanctioned difference rather than national 
homogeneity (Kastrinou 2018). The war has led, to a great extent however, towards a new 
sectarianisation of political identities (Hinnebusch 2016), ushered in new forms of populist struggle 
(Proudfoot 2017), and marked a new era of proxy conflict in the imperialist ‘struggle for Syria.’ 
At a local level, the Druze in Syria have found themselves in a difficult position, between battle 
grounds of regime and opposition forces (Kastrinou 2018).The Druze generally have attempted to 
remain as neutral as possible in the conflict often juggling a social peace with neighbours alongside 
ensuring regime protection. Yet, the increasing sectarianisation of the conflict and of the political 
discourses used in the 7-year war has affected the Druze, as it has the entire Syrian population. For the 
Druze neighbourhoo  Jaramana, in Damascus, this has meant that especially since 2013 the voices of 
political opposition and neutrality have progressively been muted, or imposed over the power of an 
alliance between sectarian and nationalist (the social nationalist party) militia; as a result what used to 
be a very liberal and multicultural Damascene suburb has become more sectarian, and more Druze. 
This is crucial: that sectarianism — in this format — has been a result, and not the cause, of the Syrian 
war. Moreover, the increase of both sectarian as well as social nationalist politics speaks directly to the 
affinity of sectarianism, fascism and authoritarian populism. 
While the Syrian state practiced imperial sectarianism in order to accommodate a sanctioned and 
sanctified degree of religious pluralism, Israel has used outright sectarianism to ‘divide and sub-dive’ 
Arab Palestinians, through the propagation of ‘Druze particularism’, meaning the construction of 
cultural, religious, social, and even genetic difference between the Druze and other Arabs in Palestine 
(Firro 2005, 2001, 1999). The myth of the Jew-Druze blood covenant, in which Jethro/Shu’ayb, who is 
considered one of the Druze prophets, married his daughter Zipporah to Moses, has been used as early 
as 1948 to produce and instrumentalise a political affinity between the Jewish state and the Druze in 
Palestine (Firro, 2005: 227; Aboultaif , 2015: 538). State propaganda of this ‘natural’ affinity is 
expressed in many examples: (1) education: to reinforce Druze separateness from Muslims and other 
Palestinian Arabs, the state had, by 1977, created a completely separate Druze education curriculum 
(Firro 1999), teaching Druze religion (as seperate to Islam), Druze folklore, as well as ‘Israeli-Druze 
consciousness’ (Firro 2001: 50; Firro 1999; Tarabieh 1995); (2) religion: where shrine pilgrimage and 
religious ‘holy’ days have been re-invented anew through Israeli state funding and propaganda, a 
practice which historian Kais Firro aptly describes as ‘Druze neoparticularism’ (Firro 2001); (3) 
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military: Israeli Druze serve mandatory conscription, unlike other Israeli Arabs that are exempt (Hajjar 
2000; Kanaaneh 2008); and (4) academic knowledge and public opinion: Israeli writers and 
academics, often with a close relation to state apparatus, have produced a substantial body of 
knowledge on ‘the Druze’ which serves to essentialise and exoticise them (see Firro 1999, 2001). This 
is nowhere more evident than in the fascination of that body of literature with ‘taqiyya’, which 
translates as ‘dissimulation’ and is a theological concept derived from Shia Islam, that permits 
adherents to the faith to disguise their beliefs when the preservation of the community is at stake 
(Makarem 1974 ). For Israeli scholars and state officials, taqiyya is used to explain and to construct 
the Druze as deferential to power, or, even to explain (away) the denial of the SDOGH to accept 
Isreali citizenship (Firro 2001: 48). 
The populist appeal of the right-wing coalition headed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the 
war in Syria, the ‘threat’ of Iran, as well as the election of Trump in the USA - who recently 
proclaimed Jerusalem as the capital of Israel - have emboldened the AP rhetoric of the Israeli 
government, and dangerously increased its security and military responses (Eichner 2018). Israel has 
increased its military presence in the Golan Heights, often using the occupied territory as a military 
base for its interventions in Syria. Using the pretext of ‘humanitarian’ interventions, Israel has been 
operating on the contested border regions and plans are underway for a ‘safe zone’ (Samaha 2018). 
Moreover, the continued occupation of the Golan Heights has been galvanised by the Israeli 
government  in order to push forth further normalisation and to propagate the agenda of AP and 
nationalism to its own citizens -- especially to the secular middle classes. Finally, AP is particularly 
prevalent in rural Israel and especially among settler communities. To understand this (and our 
subsequent analysis of the contestation over landscape narratives in the Golan), we must make explicit 
the centrality of nationalism to AP (Scoones et al., 2017; Gusterson, 2017). There is a significant body 
of literature which has aptly demonstrated the importance of rural landscapes to nationalist discourses 
and agendas (Gramsci, 1973, cited in Pratt, 1996, p. 76; Lowenthal, 1991; Zimmer, 1998; Sorlin, 
1999; Edensor, 2002; Nogue and Vicente, 2004). More specifically, the role of rural 
landscapes/peasant production in propagating alternative nationalisms is also prominent in works on 
Israel and its occupied territories (Swedenburg, 1990; Cohen & Kliot, 1992; Ram, 2014; Handel et al., 
2015). The argument we will later develop, however, is that the rural position of the SOGH renders 
them resistant to, rather than susceptible to, nationalist discourses of rurality and AP.    
Having laid out the political contexts in both Syria and Israel, we hope that it becomes clear that the 
SDOGH differ from both the Israeli Druze and their compatriots in Syria. On one hand, they have 
fiercely rejected Israeli citizenship as well as the Israeli propaganda of Druze particularism. Indeed, 
when Israel unilaterally annexed Golan in contravention of international law in December 1981, the 
SDOGH responded with a successful six-month strike that strengthened their resolve to deny Israeli 
citizenship and to remain stateless, and has since sustained political non-sectarian resistance (Kennedy 
1984; section 4.4 below). On the other hand, the sectarianisation of identities as a result of the current 
war in Syria has not made them more Druze and less Syrian. While political opinion on the Syrian war 
and its future is divided, the SDOGH have remained steadfast in their assertion of Syrian-ness 
(Phillips 2015). Opposition to AP and sectarianism among the SDOGH, therefore, challenges three 
main assumptions: (1) the Israeli historiographical propaganda that portrays the Druze as deferential; 
(2) the assumption that rural populations are more susceptible to sectarianism, nationalism and AP; 
and (3) the assumption that stateless peoples are inherently weak, landless and uprooted (Neocleous 
2003: 102-118; Soguk 1999). Why are the SDOGH so different to other Druze populations in Israel 
and Syria, and how could they have manage to resist AP from both sides of the border? Searching for 
an answer, we examine the political economy of resistance through a grounded understanding of land - 
to which we now turn. 
 
4. The politics of land 
This Section situates local perceptions and practices within the larger context of regional historical 
population changes and dynamics, as well as within a Druze-specific ethno-religious cultural context. 
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For land and landscape — their political economy as well as their ideational/ideological place among 
local communities — are dialectically related to historical changes and imbued with dynamic and 
hence changing cultural, ethno-religious meanings. We explore the politicization of, and contestation 
over, the Golan land and landscape by both the Israeli government and the SOGH through the specific 
examples of agriculture and tourism. The Section thus considers the material and ideational part 
played by land in the opposing efforts of Israel and the SOGH, respectively, to control, discipline and 
normalize on the one hand, and to resist, defy and emancipate on the other. Despite the brutal, 
sustained and systematic efforts of the Israeli government to appropriate the land, it is the 
steadfastness of the native population in their determination to retain their connection to the land that, 
in part, helps us understand why this rural population stayed after the 1967 war, and how they have 
managed to resist as well as to maintain their connection to the land. 
4.1 Land expropriation and restrictions 
Although the SDOGH escaped, or were spared, the worst of the forced evictions and dispossessions 
inflicted by the Israeli army on other members of the indigenous population, they were and have been 
subject to significant expropriations of land, human rights violations and discrimination by the 
legislative apparatus of the Israeli state (Halabi, 1992; Murphy & Gannon, 2008; O Cuinn, 2011; 
Hanlon, 2012; Keary, 2013). Whilst the majority of the SDOGH with title retained their private 
holdings (see Section 4.2), the community, as a whole, was deprived of access to and use of the 
common grazing lands that surrounded the settlements: 
Whilst the Syrian government respected the ownership of each village’s common land, Israel 
considers all land that is not under private ownership to be ‘state land’ [Thiab] 
There are no more cows and goats among the Syrians, only a few animals to remember! What 
parts of the common are still cultivated have all turned into little farms and there is a specific 
Israeli agri-environmental law which restricts grazing on the common land [Salman] 
We have no licenced grazing lands so we are very limited in the cattle, sheep and goats we can 
keep. The real cow sheds are in the Israeli settlements - so they exploit all the Golan land, if not 
for army training and minefields then for large-scale cattle farming [Salih] 
The Israeli state thus refused to accept community ownership of common grazing lands that had 
hitherto been respected by the Syrian government and subsequently introduced legal restrictions on 
grazing practices through environmental designations and laws. Davis (1983) reports that agricultural 
production was flourishing in the Golan in the period leading up to the 1967 invasion. Syrian statistics 
show it was supporting 37,000 head of cattle, 1-2 million sheep and goats and 2.7 million fruit trees. 
Moreover, 64% of the population was employed in farming and fishing. Molony et al. (2009, p57) 
argue that the vast reduction in livestock-keeping following the occupation was not only an indirect 
consequence of the appropriation of land but an intentional policy designed to deprive the SOGH of 
their local private economies. They draw on the testimony of Mufeed Al Wili, who suggests that not 
only land but livestock too were confiscated: 
I think the prevention of this [grazing] wasn’t an accident. Something was planned by the 
authorities. It was a target. [The production of] meat and milk is flourishing in the settlements. 
They put tens of thousands of cows in the forests there. They close it here and they open it there. 
The main reason for this [decrease in grazing] is the confiscation of land around the village of 
Bqa‘atha for the settlers ... The places we used to graze our flocks became agricultural fields for 
the settlers. What we have left is only the forest of Mas‘ada… the nature reservation authority in 
Israel declared that the presence of the sheep and goats in the forest is harmful. They tried to 
stop this economic activity in different ways … by confiscating the flocks and selling them for 
the benefit of the State of Israel. They did this three times. (Mufeed Al Wili, in Molony et al., 
2009, pp. 61-63). 
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Whilst these various mechanisms vastly reduced the SOGH access to common lands, direct 
appropriations by the military also affected individual private holdings in drastic manner: 
My father was born in 1925 and his family have owned and worked the land since that time. 
Before the occupation I had 63 Dunums, but 18 Dunums is now a closed military zone while 
another 15 Dunums are minefields. That leaves me with just 30 Dunums, which I continue to 
farm. (Ghali) 
As Yiftachel and Segal (1998: 501) point out, the military and environmental appropriations serve the 
same general purpose of emphasizing the Israeli state as the absolute power holder in the control of 
lands. The propagation of a conservationist rhetoric, however, is tied to a ‘constructed’ Israeli-Jewish 
value in the preservation of nature and serves to mask the nationalist ideology from which the material 
consequences of the environmental designations are clearly derived. 
The quote above reflects a wider view from our respondents that there had been significant advances 
in agricultural techniques and production following, and on account of, the occupation. However, 
restrictions on farmers’ access to international markets for their produce, and their inability to compete 
with heavily subsidised and supported Israeli settler farms on better and larger holdings, meant that 
earning a living solely from farming has become increasingly unviable for the SOGH. By rejecting 
Israeli citizenship since 1982 the SOGH have suffered further restrictions and discrimination on 
agricultural practices vis-a-vis settler Israeli farmers.  
We have had to adapt our farming based purely on our abilities and experiences. We have 
received no support for agricultural development whilst the settlers receive scientific expertise, 
equipment, infrastructure, financial aid and irrigation. The settlers have more than double the 
area of agricultural land as us, receive a larger quota of water and pay less for it. (Yusef) 
In forty years of occupation we have been prevented from reclaiming land and developing our 
own water collection and irrigation systems. Meanwhile Israel took control of Ram Lake, the 
largest water body in the Golan and stopped us from using it. If we had access to Ram Lake we 
would be in a far better position now. The settlers get triple the quota of water and pay half as 
much as we do. This hugely affects the amount and type of production we can engage in and 
means we cannot compete - you can not compare the two situations. (Ahmad) 
In the following sections we examine the historical, economic, geographical, cultural and religious 
specificities that help us to - at least partially - understand why, despite this incredible imposed 
adversity, the SDOGH remained with their land during and subsequent to the 1967 war. 
4.2 Sanctity in the mountains? Historical, economic and geographical contexts 
Economic, historical and geographical circumstances became materially important influences on the 
SDOGH’s decision to stay in the Golan following the 1967 and 1973 wars. Until that moment, the 
majority of land in the Golan Heights was farmed under tenancy arrangements or involved pastoralism 
on state-owned common lands (musha’) (Abu-Husayn 2015: 4; Owen 2002: 258; Wingfeld 2013). In 
contrast to both Bedouin and other Syrian newcomers to the area, the majority of the Druze population 
in the Golan Heights were private owners of agricultural land, as a result of their labour investment in 
terracing and improving mountainous state-lands following their arrival from Lebanon in 1860 (Firro, 
1990, p.159). The Druze villages of the Golan thus had something very economically tangible to lose 
by fleeing to Syria as a result of the occupation.  
Second, is the strong (but not unproblematic) association between Druze communities and a sense of 
sanctity provided by the mountains in which they typically dwell. Most of the literature that explores 
the connections of the Druze to their land, explains this as directly linked to their historical experience 
of being a persecuted religious minority, and the topographic sanctity of their mountainous lands 
(Khuri, 2004). Like many other religious groups in the region, the remoteness of their mountainous 
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dwellings impacted on how they could be governed and, in some cases, their distance from urban 
centres afforded them a degree of autonomy and safety. 
If the SDOGH had believed that their mountainous villages afforded them a certain degree of 
protection, then this view could have been supported by the fact that the Druze settlements in the 
Golan avoided the frontline battles fought during the Six Day War. However, such a perception would 
have been quickly upturned when they bore witness to the Israeli military’s ability to track down and 
drive out their Syrian neighbours who had fled to the Druze mountains during and subsequent to the 
conflict: 
A lot of people came to hide in Majdal Shams because it was far in the mountains. …. 
Everyday, the Israelis came and started shouting at them. After two weeks the Israelis told the 
people who were hiding that they could return safely to their own villages. As the people came 
out of hiding the Israeli soldiers began to shoot at them to frighten them and make them run 
away to other parts of Syria. The people had been tricked by the Israelis into thinking it was safe 
to come out of hiding and return to their villages (Taiseer Maray in Murphy & Gannon, 2008, 
p.26) 
Such witnessing of the selective targeting by the military of particular religious groups would then 
lend support to the theories that the Druze had been intentionally permitted to remain in order to 
support Israeli sectarian identity politics: 
The village residents stayed for a number of reasons: the memory of the 1925 revolution, the 
fact that Mount Hermon did not witness any acts of war. We later found out, however, that the 
Israeli government had an interest in keeping the Druze as a protected minority to propagate 
divisions between Arabs in other parts of their occupied territory. (Said) 
For most of our interlocutors, the collective memory of the Syrian Revolt in 1925, was what shaped 
the decision to stay with their homes and land. During the Syrian Revolt against the French Mandate, 
the Druze villages of the GH sided with Pasha Atrash’s forces against the colonial forces, and as a 
repercussion the French colonial forces punished the village of Majdal Shams by emptying it and then 
destroying it. The colonial French forces, before Israel, were the first to use the techniques of ethnic 
cleansing and collective punishment in these lands. This incident remains deeply inscribed in the 
collective memory of the indigenous population, on par with the uprootedness experienced by the 
Palestinians who were forced to leave their land in 1948. Both of these instances are deeply ingrained 
examples of the uprootedness that follows if people abandon their houses and fields during war. 
Almost all of the people we interviewed mentioned the historical memory of uprootedness as one of 
the main reasons that they decided to stay put. They also stressed that they could not necessarily 
conceive of anywhere else that would guarantee them a greater degree of protection, and an 
assumption that the occupation would be short-lived.  
We never expected that some day the Golan would be under a Zionist occupation … At first, we 
thought the invasion would last a couple of days or months and that we would soon be back to 
our Syrian homeland. ... We prefer to die than to leave our land. We were also with the 
Palestinians when they got displaced; we heard their stories of missing home, so we decided to 
hold on and stay under all circumstances. A great credit also has to go to the Druze religious 
elders who went out into the street and insisted that everyone should not leave their homes, that 
we should stay. (Saida) 
Despite these various material reasons which help us understand why the Druze remained in the 
Golan, and despite the distancing from religion among many of the politicised SOGH, the important 
role played by the Druze shaykhs in organising a collective decision to remain following the 
occupation is testament to the continued importance of a culturally specific relationship between the 
Druze and the land, to which we turn next.  
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4.3 Druze-land relations: honour, work and reincarnation 
This section explores a complex of cultural repertoires that interweave the Druze to their land through 
the three interconnected concepts of honour, work, and reincarnation. The intimate interconnection 
between land as a prerequisite to the autonomy in defending honour and religion is apparent in Khuri’s 
discussion of land and identity among the Druze: ‘Land (ard), honour (‘ird) and religion (din), in this 
order of significance, constitute a sacred trinity among the Druze’(2004: 55).  Khuri, moreover, 
provides a powerful local proverb: ‘he who has no land cannot protect his honour and he who has no 
honour has no religion’ (Ibid.) This proverb emphases the centrality of land for the continuation of the 
Druze community, connecting the complex cultural category of honour (‘ird) - referring to the 
protections of close female relations -  to land, which itself then becomes engendered in the rich social 
milieu of protection, kinship, solidarity and shame (Kastrinou 2016; Khuri 2004).  
This connectivity to the land, furthermore, manifests itself in normative values and expectations in 
human-land relations. Like elsewhere in Arab societies, among the SDOGH, selling one’s land is 
considered shameful, effeminate, and is, according to our informants, very rare.5  Moreover, it is 
socially embarrassing to be seen as, or labelled as ‘lazy’ (kazoul) (a value in the work ethic found 
among many agricultural communities, see Emery, 2014; Davidson, 2009). To be properly, and 
agriculturally, engaged with the land is to be valorised as a hard worker (sayal). In the Golan Heights, 
farmers are bestowed with pride when ‘he only changed out of his work clothes to go to his daughter’s 
wedding!’ Or, ‘blessed be he who dies whilst working the land!’ 
More widely, connectivity to the land is further sanctified through the purity of associated financial 
transactions: ‘Only the money that comes directly from the land is halal to them,’ mentioned Sami, 
who went on to explain how very religious, pious families or individuals (usually shaykhs) consider 
money derived from doing business to be ‘dirty’ (wasih) and prohibited (haram). This contrasts with 
money derived directly from personal work in the land, and usually such families in the Golan have a 
small portion of land for household subsistence, as well as land with apples or cherries for selling at 
the market. Here, connectivity to land is embodied, whilst the dangers of potential contamination are 
of grave religious significance. ‘Dirty’ money is understood as money derived from waged labour, and 
is used for keeping their house (bills, maintenance, etc.), whereas ‘clean’ money from one’s own 
produce is used to buy foodstuffs the family cannot produce for itself. The embodiment of Druzeness 
itself, then, is inextricably linked to accessing, consuming and returning to the land. 
Moreover, religious ideas of reincarnation, as well as spiritual markers, such as shrines (maqamat) and 
places of prayer (khalwat), bind the Druze to their land. In a fascinating study about Druze places of 
worship and pilgrimage in Syria, Fartacek (2012) demonstrates that the local concept of ‘baraka’ 
(blessing) is manifested through an explicit and unmediated connection between land and the divine 
(also see Fartacek and Nigst, forthcoming). This idea is supported in Druze theosophy, and in 
particular through the Druze belief in reincarnation (taqamuṣ) (Bennett 2006). Sharing many aspects 
of other egalitarian reincarnation discourses (Kastrinou and Layton 2016), the Druze believe that  all 
human souls were created at once, human souls only reincarnate into human bodies, and, particularly, 
Druze souls only reincarnate into Druze bodies. Taqamuṣ is understood as the cyclical expression of 
immaterial souls through corporeal bodies: ‘just as a meaning makes sense only when expressed 
through its word, so must the human soul be expressed in a human body’ (Makarem 2005: 5). The 
relation between land and the divine is similar to the relation between Druze bodies and souls: in the 
same way that Druze souls are given permanence in bodies, land is the place where the divine 
manifests itself, and indeed where the Druze community is given permanence. In fieldwork and 
interviews, belief in reincarnation was very widespread, with only two of our interlocutors openly 
rejecting it. Moreover, what was remarkable was that even interlocutors who self-subscribed as 
‘secularist’ or ‘Communists’ believed in reincarnation: ‘I believe in the unity of the universe... 
Everything comes and goes back to earth’ (Ahmad). 
                                                 
5
 Similar attitudes and practices are described for the Druze in Lebanon by Khuri (20014: 53-56). 
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Reincarnation, moreover, provides a discourse through which a generalised eternal interconnection 
between people and land, as well as land and autonomy, can be made. Kastrinou & Layton (2016) 
show that reincarnation can be analysed as a politics of time. This is partly because of the uniqueness 
of Druze-to-Druze reincarnation, namely that Druze souls reincarnate only into Druze bodies, 
continuously, hence, embodying and recycling an originary community and kinship. However, they 
locate the apparent structural entropy as a contemporary discourse that is used by the Druze, as well as 
other groups that find themselves in structural disadvantage within modern nation states:  
“Reincarnation is a discourse which lays a political and a geographic claim to time, in a similar 
fashion that nationhood implies, in the Westphalian sense, a claim over sovereign boundaries 
and frontiers. For [...] the Druze, material boundaries are of course important metaphysically as 
well as practically. Yet, their legitimacy (in search of a better word) collapses geography, whilst 
their time is place. Empires rise and fall. Nations wax and wane. Frontiers change hands. But, 
and here is the powerful potential of the discourse of reincarnation as a political claim to 
eternity, theirs is an autochthonous reckoning, a sovereignty of time.” (Kastrinou and Layton 
2016: 166) 
Reincarnation provides a narrative rootedness to the land that is not contingent upon the realisation of 
nationalist territorial claims. This observation helps to understand why the Druze in particular have 
felt less threatened, and in some ways emboldened, by their stateless condition: regardless of whether 
they have found themselves a minority group within or without a State, their claim to space through 
time has remained a consistent political strategy and source of reassurance. Moreover, Druze ideas 
about the sacredness of land also directly relate to the perceived autonomy that land-work provides 
(Aboultaif 2015; Kastrinou 2016; Khuri 2004). In the following Section we turn to look at how this 
cultural value in autonomy through continued industrious engagement with the land helps us to 
understand the role and importance of farming continuity as an act of resistance in itself. 
4.4 Resistance and Autonomy 
We as a people have a saying that the child and the land and the spirit are one and the same. We 
do not want to leave and be scattered ... When you die your blood should be in your land. This 
is what we believe. (Izzat al-Ayoub, in Abu Fakhr, 2000, pp. 15-16) 
Autonomy, among the Druze, is one of the highest forms of piety because those who are able to 
sustain themselves from their own work in the land have a greater degree of independence from 
worldly, selfish-driven profit. It is not surprising that in the most religiously important retreat among 
the Druze, the khalwa of Bayada in Lebanon, the resident shaykhs there lead very humble, selfless and 
independent lives as they only consume what they themselves can produce from the land (Khuri 2004: 
45). In the case of the GH, this religious orthopraxy of land autonomy has gained the additional 
political layer of resisting dependence upon Israeli occupation and economy. This ethic of resistance 
through the land was expressed by many of our respondents: 
There is nothing politically important like the importance of the land. If there is no land there is 
no homeland and without a homeland there is no belonging, and without belonging we have no 
identity! (Salman) 
Our home is the most sacred thing to us, we did not leave our land to find home, we wish that 
the homeland [Syria] comes back to us, so we resist the occupation... Your land is your honour, 
your home, you have to defend it. For me, homeland is the mother of man, the big house which 
protects everyone ... we have not once said that we are Israelis, we are Syrian Arabs under 
occupation and we want our homeland to be a secular democratic state. (Saida) 
Our connection with mother earth is so deep and strong, we can’t leave our homeland … The 
principle is to keep our land, our homeland and Arabism (Ghali) 
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From the above quotes it is possible to trace a religious influence on the political defiance expressed. 
Importantly, however, the final two quotes demonstrate that, despite religious links, the political 
discourse expressed is one that eschews sectarian identity politics and the current conjunction of AP in 
favour of secularism and Arabism. And it is on account of this combined religious and political 
imperative that we can understand the unfolding of particular acts of resistance among the SDOGH.  
For example, to avoid the shame of land being sold, and the risk of land passing out of Druze hands, 
the SDOGH have implemented a system of shared inheritance, whereby land is passed into the 
collective ownership of a number of heirs. Like other Druze communities within Israel (Yiftachel and 
Segal, 1998, p. 484) this prevents the temptation by an individual to sell their land for profit and 
makes it more difficult for those wishing to legally acquire land from the indigenous population. 
Whilst this can be seen as a protective mechanism it also has the effect of reducing the viability of the 
land for agricultural production because of multiple ownership and, in some cases, de facto 
fragmentation. However, many of our respondents reported that despite the Israeli ingresses, the size 
of their holdings actually increased in the years immediately after the 1967 and 1973 wars. This can be 
explained by one of the most famous acts of resistance undertaken by the SOGH. Recognising the 
Israeli government’s likely claim to the collectively owned village lands the community, organised 
through agricultural associations, occupied, divided up and enclosed large areas of formerly rough 
pasture land and improved it for apple cultivation. As O Cuinn (2011) reports, the apple trees are a 
potent symbol for the SOGH and were as much an affirmation of the community’s rightful 
connectivity and rootedness to the land as they were indicative of direct struggles over land and 
resources. 
This cultivation and use of the common lands remains highly contested between the SOGH and the 
Israeli government, with respective rounds of planting and uprooting being highly symbolic of this 
struggle over claims to and connectivity with the land. More recently, the SOGH occupied a new area 
of village lands around Majdal Shams in defiance of Israeli development control to allow building of 
new homes for the growing indigenous population (see Molony et al., 2009). Beyond the internal and 
external symbolism of produce, many of the SOGH implicitly connect farming and ‘developing the 
land as a matter of steadfastness (sumud 6)’(Sami). In another famous example of resistance through 
agricultural organisation, the SOGH also responded to the confiscation of, and discriminatory charging 
for, indigenous water resources (as detailed in Section 4.1) by developing their own irrigation systems 
and installing rainwater collection tanks on their lands. Again, this has remained an area of ongoing 
contestation and struggle with the Israeli authorities (see Molony et al, 2009: 71-80) but is 
representative of the SOGH’s determination to retain sovereignty over their resources and to resist 
dependency on Israel for the provision of their basic needs. 
Without this dogged determination to remain agriculturally self-sufficient and autonomous the SOGH 
would have been unlikely to remain steadfast during what was their greatest single act of political 
defiance: the strike of 1982. When the Israeli Knesset passed the annexation of the Golan Heights on 
14 December 1981, the SOGH responded with an initial 3-day general strike. However, on 14 
February, and after Israel placed four community leaders under administrative detention, a general 
strike that lasted six months was declared (Mara’i and Halabi 1992: 83). Israel responded by imposing 
a curfew and eventually a full blockade. Electricity and water were cut, while crops and livestock were 
either deliberately destroyed or perished. Villagers responded with mass demonstrations, by violating 
curfew in order to harvest crops, and sometimes by walking en masse to a neighbouring village 
(Kennedy 1984: 53). Moreover, they seized the opportunity to collectivize and ‘strike-in-reverse’ by 
creating new agricultural cooperatives, distributing food among the community, sharing work, and 
even completing a major sewer project (Kennedy 1984: 54). In the following quote, Saida recollects 
the time of the strike: 
                                                 
6
 There is a huge body of literature on sumud among Palestinian farmers; as an indication see: Swedenburg 
1990; Smith and Isleem 2017; McKee 2017; Braverman 2009. Currently, researcher Muna Dajani is completing 
a PhD looking into steadfstness (sumud) among Golani farmers, see: http://www.jawlany.com/-صالون-الجوالن-يبحث
  utm_campaign=shareaholic&utm_medium=email_this&utm_source=email?/مستقبل-الزراعة-في-ا
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“Firstly, they [IDF] blockaded the villages: Masada alone, Buq'ata alone, alMajdal alone… During the 
period of the siege it was forbidden to go out, forbidden to see your neighbour, is forbidden to stand 
on the window! The strike was difficult! The [Israeli] soldiers distributed identities to people, but 
people threw them! … Then, delegations came from the Arabs in Palestine, in solidarity with us and 
this was a sweet life… there was interaction with the people of Palestine, Arab members of the 
Knesset, even Jewish members of the Knesset, who were against this decision [the annexation]. We 
always had guests, who brought material and moral and financial aid. But then Israel stopped people 
entering our area, and then Israel cut off the milk for the kids, so they brought milk, and food… We 
made a committee responsible for the distribution [of food], to fulfil the needs of everyone in the 
village. People with shops [contributed], those who had cows was distributing milk for children. But 
what did they [IDF] do, they burned the wheat that feed the cows, so that they do not produce more 
milk!  When something like that happened, people went to give him [the affected farmer] wheat, 
which they had in their homes, or run during the night to extinguish the fire… You feel unity at that 
time, that all people are one fist… If you come to my house I do not care that I do not have meat to 
cook, six months like this… no beef to cook, and there is no open shop. But we store in our house the 
supply of food, so can eat food from home one full year without the need to buy something from out, 
and more, I cook and I do not need to buy something from abroad, this is something sweet. Ah, the 
strike. We were happy.” 
The strike finished, somewhat abruptly, when Israel invaded Lebanon in July 1982. Its main 
achievement was that the SDOGH were not forced to get Israeli citizenship, but rather Israeli 
‘residency,’ while their nationality is ‘undefined’. As a Druze protester put it: ‘Israel can do whatever 
it wants to us: they can confiscate out land. They can kill us. But they cannot tell us who we are. They 
cannot change our identity’ (Kennedy 1984: 53). Although it has not spared the SOGH from human 
rights violations, the strike of 1982 continues to inform political resistance as well as economic 
cooperation among Syrian farmers and relative autonomy. 
In the following Section we turn to consider the struggle for land between Israel and the SOGH in not 
only material but ideational terms. In particular, we explore the claims made by Israel for a legitimate 
presence in the land through the propagation of a particular landscape idea. In keeping with the 
argument developed in the preceding Sections, we argue that despite such efforts, it is the SOGH who 
are most legitimately able to register their claims to the land. This is on account of their claim to space 
through time (reincarnation discourse) and their capacity (unlike the Israelis who must necessarily 
conceal certain traces in the land) to draw on the landscape’s entire symbolic repertoire. 
4.5 Contesting the landscape idea: agriculture and tourism 
A deep, symbolic and cultural connection to the land among agriculturalists has been reported widely 
in different contexts to explain why farming, farm work and the rural landscapes they produce are not 
considered only as material economic activities and artefacts but at the heart of the maintenance and 
reproduction of identities (e.g. Cohen 1985, Emery, 2014, Ingold 1984). This is also very much 
associated with the conveyance of a perceived/claimed right to the landscape on account of an historic 
and/or continued relationship between a particular community/nation and the land it works (Egoz et 
al., 2011). It is on these terms that we can understand the nature of the conflict between the Israeli 
government/settlers and the SOGH as much an issue of symbolism, ideas and identities as it is an issue 
of resource allocation. Moreover, in this context, the Golan landscape is not just a multifariously 
interpreted curiosity, but an ideological battleground over competing nationalist claims. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that establishing a working and agricultural connectivity between Israelis 
and the land (whilst simultaneously depriving or severely limiting the ability of others to maintain 
such connections) has been central to the Israeli government (and Zionist aspirations) in their quest for 
establishing legitimate claims to the land. Egoz (2011) argues that land, and farming landscapes in 
particular, became symbolically central to Zionism’s efforts to promote the creation of a homeland by 
inventing a stereotype of ‘the New Jew’ as attached and rooted to territory as opposed to the traditional 
stereotype of the ‘exilic wandering Jew that has no roots’ (p. 167, italics in original). This need to 
establish a ‘settlement myth’ through the ideological loading of the landscape (Kellerman, 1996) has 
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been explored in relation to Israeli agricultural settlements by Handel et al. (2015). The point of these 
myths, they point out, is to ‘normalise’ the Israeli control of the territories and are primarily aimed at 
the secular Israeli citizen, as opposed to the occupied communities or the international community (see 
also Long, 2008; Ram, 2014, 2015; Gordon and Ram, 2016). Handel et al. show how the Israeli wine 
industry (mis)uses the concept of terroir to manufacture an association between land, soil, weather, 
people and rooted connectivity in the so-called ‘Wine Country’ of the Golan Heights. As the authors’ 
explain, despite the fact that it makes no sense to use the concept of terroir on a number of grounds in 
this context, it has proved extremely successful in appealing to middle class and secular Israelis who 
associate a privileged taste, and marker of their social standing, with a product that is marketed as a 
unique combination of the people and the lands that produced it. Long (2008), meanwhile, shows how 
diasporic tree-planting in occupied Palestine (promoted by the Jewish National Fund) serves a similar 
function of creating a physical, and deep connectivity or rootedness to the land. This is part of a 
Zionist quest for redemption through the land, that can only be achieved through cultivation. More 
specifically in the Golan Heights, Molony et al. (2009, p.50) have reported that settler communities 
have taken to importing and planting mature trees on their new farmsteads to give the impression of 
longevity and permanent rootedness to the landscape. 
Whilst the manufactured idea of terroir and tree-planting can make physical claims to the future 
rootedness to a territory, they lack historical legitimacy. Writing about the Druze in Israel, Yiftachel 
and Segal (1998, p. 502) argue that the spiritual and intimate connectivity between the indigenous 
community and the land is regarded as highly threatening to the settler society, which is still in the 
process of nation-building. For the Druze, ‘the land is the same as that which their ancestors 
cultivated, lived on, and where they were ultimately buried. [This] gives indigenous populations a 
strong sense of belonging and a true sense of history. It is as if the indigenous minority possesses the 
past in a specific place’ (ibid. our emphasis). How, then, can the Israeli government and the Zionist 
movement link agricultural connectivity to the land with a long historical pedigree in its settlement 
myths and normalisation efforts? To answer this question we look at the example of the Jacob Sheep, 
which have been proposed to be ‘re-introduced’ to the Golan Heights as the living embodiment of 
Israel’s historic claims to the holy land. We have already seen how the opportunities for the SOGH to 
graze livestock have been virtually extinguished by the appropriation by Israel of communal grazing 
lands as state lands, the imposition of limitations on grazing through conservation law and the direct 
confiscation of livestock. This also serves a wider process of disassociating the indigenous community 
with the land via their stock. The historical legitimacy of a relationship between stock, people, and 
place has been explored by anthropologists through recourse to the ‘genetic metaphor’ (Gray, 1998, 
Emery, 2010). This suggests that just as livestock are bred to be suited to live in particular 
environments, so too are the herders and farmers who tend them. This metaphor is powerfully 
expressed in the case of the Jacob Sheep. 
The story (as it is framed) begins in Canada with the happenstantial acquisition of four Jacob sheep by 
Israeli ex-pat Gil and South African Jenna Lewinsky and is reported in The Times of Israel (Melanie 
Lidman) in December 2015. The newspaper article reports how the couple became fascinated by the 
history of the breed and their connectivity to Judaism and the Middle East. Moreover, they became 
motivated by a desire to repatriate the sheep to their land of origin: the Nation of Israel, and 
specifically the Golan Heights. The sheep are described as one of the oldest ‘heritage breeds’ in the 
world and are linked to Judaism through the book of Genesis, in which Jacob (after whom the breed is 
named) is recorded as having tended a flock of sheep with ‘spots and speckles’. The Lewinskys thus 
describe the sheep as ‘biblical’ and Jewish with a story that parallels that of the Jewish people:  
“What drew us to the Jacob sheep is that the story parallels the story of the Jewish 
people,” explained Jenna Lewinsky ... “Jews have been wandering for 2,000 years, 
and the sheep have a similar story, from Canaan to Canada today. It’s a full 
journey.” 
The couple lament the fact that whilst the ‘exilic’ Jews have returned to their homeland, the Jacob 
sheep have not. It is clear from the narrative of the story, however, that the sheep are to be used as 
much as a justification for the ‘return’ of a Jewish population to the land and occupied territories of 
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Israel, as the nation and the people are to be used as a justification for the ‘return’ of the sheep. The 
friends of the jacob sheep website (http://friendsofthejacobsheep.weebly.com/), for instance, lists its 
aims as: 
1. To conserve the ancient heirloom (unaltered) sheep flock and bring them back to their 
land and nation of origin: The state of Israel 
2. To re-establish a Jewish national flock in the land and nation of their origin 
The reason that the sheep can perform this function so well, is because of the historical legitimacy they 
give to the Jewish people and the claimed territories of Israel: 
The Lewinskys point out that sheep have always been intricately woven into the history of 
Judaism, from the wool used for ritual garments like the tallit to the sacrificial pascal lamb. 
“Moses was a shepherd. He saw the burning bush when he was running after sheep,” said Gil 
Lewinsky. “Attending to livestock is a core profession of our people, and an important part of 
our roots.” 
Hence the sheep, through their association with the Jewish people, and their association with the lands 
and occupied territories of Israel provide a legitimacy for a Jewish presence. But it is a legitimacy that 
can only be upheld if the Jewish people and their sheep can be reunited on ‘their lands’. This mutuality 
of the Jacob sheep and the Jewish people, and their associated right to the land, is extended through a 
potent use of the genetic metaphor. The article reports that the Lewinskys specifically wish to establish 
a heritage farm in the Golan Heights because there ‘the mineral rich soils mean they won’t have to 
provide supplemental minerals like farmers do in other parts of the world’. This could be interpreted 
as evidence of the Sheep’s, and by extension their Jewish shepherds’, right to the Golan landscape 
through the concept of being ‘bred to’ the land (Gray, 1998). And if the link between the sheep’s 
genetic right and the Jewish people’s genetic right to dwell in the Golan was not explicit enough, the 
article also reports that the sheep share a ‘uniquely Jewish’ genetic disorder: Tay-Sachs disease, which 
affects Ashkenazi Jews. This powerful narrative thus asserts that the Sheep and the Jewish people are 
genetically bound to one another and to the land to which they lay claim. 
The effectiveness of this nationalist rhetoric is evidenced by the fact that the Lewinskys were able to 
overcome insurmountable legal and bureaucratic hurdles to successfully transport a flock of Jacob 
Sheep to Israel in January 2017. This was on account of high level support for the ‘beautiful story’ by 
the Israeli Embassy in Canada and a crowd-sourcing campaign which raised a significant amount of 
money to cover the transportation costs and taxes (which in themselves amounted to $80,000). Now in 
Israel, the friends of the Jacob Sheep website contains links to the many news publications covering 
their story and a new campaign to name newly born lambs. The Lewinskys are also campaigning for 
the Jacob sheep to be recognised as the national animal of Israel and to be afforded special 
conservation status. 
Whilst this ideational work, through agricultural connectivity to the land, continues to gain 
momentum, the Israeli government’s aspiration to populate the Golan Heights with settler farmers has 
fallen short of target. Where the Israeli government have been hugely successful, both ideationally and 
materially, however, is in their claim to the Golan Heights as an Israeli tourist destination. This idea of 
touristic consumption through recreation appeals particularly to the secular, middle class Israeli 
population, at whom much of the nationalist rhetoric and claims to Israeli rights to the Golan are 
aimed. Indeed, it is this fact, argue Handel et al., (2015, p. 1360), which explains why the secular 
Israeli citizen has more readily accepted Israel’s claim to the Golan than to the occupied Palestinian 
territories (Gordon and Ram [2016] also point out that this is facilitated by the more ‘complete’ level 
of ethnic cleansing in the Golan Heights). Whilst the Palestinian territories have religiously important 
sites, there is little that is attractive to the secular Israeli to encourage physical engagement with the 
landscape. 
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Immediately after, if not before, the war in 1967 it seems the Israeli government had already 
earmarked the Golan Heights as a future tourist destination. Ram (2015) reports that archaeologists 
and planners were dispatched to the Golan Heights to identify abandoned villages which should be 
retained on account of their “archaeological, historical, and touristic values” (ISA, 1967; 1968, in 
Ram, 2015, p. 27). Ram’s more sustained contribution to the study of the development of tourism in 
the Golan Heights, however, relates to his examination of the normalisation of the Golan landscape 
through spatial mimicry. Ram (2014) argues that tourism in the Golan Heights, and specifically the 
development of the Mount Hermon ski resort, is part of a domestication strategy aimed at secular 
Israelis. The development, in physical appearance as well as in marketing, mimics a European Alpine 
ski resort intended to render the militarily important mountain a site of passive fun and entertainment. 
Moreover, representations of the resort mobilise a discourse of whiteness which, argues Ram (2014), 
serves to set the snow-capped mountain apart from its Middle Eastern setting and the users of the 
mountain apart from their Arab co-habitants. The success of the resort, and of tourism more generally 
in the Golan, was seen by our respondents to marginalise and discriminate against the indigenous 
population on account of their exclusion from the ability to benefit economically from the tourist 
industry and, perhaps more importantly, because they felt the development excluded them from 
accessing ‘their’ sacredly important mountain: 
There are no services in Golan that make our lives much easier. It is hard to develop industrially 
and we are prevented from benefiting from tourism. For example Mount Hermon is close to 
Majdal Shams but all the economic benefits from the tourist trade go to Israelis! People from 
Majdal Shams can’t visit their Mount Hermon without having to pay money to enter, whilst the 
Israelis profit hugely, especially during the ski season (Thiab) 
Despite the success of the tourist enterprise, Ram (2014, 2015) also argues that the normalisation 
process never entirely succeeds as the military history and evidence of the Golan as a space of 
exception remains all too present in the contemporary landscape. These cracks are also exploited by 
the Arab Centre for Human Rights in the Golan Heights (Al-Marsad), which has launched its own 
‘alternative tourism’ service (see also Aviv, 2011 on alternative Jewish tourism in the West Bank). 
With this service Al-Marsad aim to challenge the Israeli tourist narrative which seeks to ‘normalise the 
occupation’ and cover up ‘the injustices committed against the native Syrian population’. Instead, the 
alternative tourist experience gives the ‘local Syrian population a voice to speak about their 
experiences under the occupation’ and shows ‘the beauty of the Golan through a human rights lens’. 
Activities offered include touring indigenous towns, destroyed villages and Israeli settlements 
alongside more conventional and recreational touristic activities such as hiking, kayaking and 
swimming in hot natural springs. What Al-Marsad is able to do then, is to appropriate the development 
and portrayal of the Golan (by Israel) as a tourist destination (founded on its natural beauty and 
outdoor activities) whilst simultaneously bringing to the fore the very human rights violations and 
indigenous struggles that the conventional Israeli tourism tries to hide. The indigenous Syrians are 
able to consolidate their political narrative around the landscapes’ entire symbolic repertoire, whilst 
the Israelis are necessarily more limited, and thus have to be more creative, in their quest for 
legitimacy and ideological claims to the land. 
This Section has demonstrated that whilst the Israeli government clearly has significant power and 
authority over the land as a material resource, the idea of the land, of the landscape and the quest for 
legitimacy through rootedness, is far more contested and contestable. Moreover, we might say that in 
order to earn a living from the land under the constraints of occupation the indigenous Syrians have to 
work that land far harder than their Israeli counterparts on settler farms. In contrast, however, we 
might further observe that the Israeli’s have to work the idea of the land far harder than do the 
indigenous Syrians. Despite the Israeli government’s efforts to erase evidence of Syrian inhabitation 
from the Golan landscape that landscape, in all its variety, remains an historically and symbolically 
rich resource upon which the indigenous population builds its political claims. As Emery and 
Carrithers (2016) suggest, through their agricultural, cultural and historical proximity to the land, the 
rural indigenous population is more readily able to convert a politics of experience into a legitimate 
politics of representation. It is this, combined with a small but strong foothold of continued private 
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ownership, that makes the Stateless condition of the indigenous Syrian population so interesting when 
considering rural emancipation more widely; it somehow renders them rooted but out-of-reach. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion: Stateless but rooted 
Unlike their Israeli counterparts, the SDOGH have not pursued minority protection through deference 
to state power and conscription to the Jewish-Druze covenant as might have been assumed. And unlike 
the majority of their Syrian counterparts, the SDOGH have not closed religious ranks and emphasised 
their Druzeness in response to the Syrian War. Instead, they have resisted the deployment of sectarian 
identity politics by the Israeli and Syrian regimes to breed fear and garner consent. In this paper we 
explain this emancipatory political positioning on account of: a specific historical and economic 
context; a specific and strong cultural and spiritual connectivity to the land, and; a unique condition of 
statelessness. But what makes their stateless condition unique? Conventionally, statelessness is 
associated with displaced populations who find themselves uprooted and lacking the protection of any 
state (Soguk 1999; Walzer 1983). However, the possibility of statelessness lies at the heart of modern 
state formation, as Neocleous provocatively shows through the history of how bandits and pirates 
became the first stateless people (2003: 100-103). Lacking the loyalty to belong to, as well as lacking 
of need for protection from, the newly-found territorial sovereignty of the state, transformed bandits 
and pirates from reliable mercenaries to threatening adversaries: statelessness, thus, became 
‘inherently dangerous to the state’ (Neocleous 2003: 109).  
The uniqueness of the SOGH resistance relates to their condition of statelessness, a condition that 
nevertheless does not imply 'landless' - as is usually the case with other stateless people. The fact that 
the native population has remain both 'rooted,' in terms of maintaining and even enhancing its 
connection with the land, as well as outside of the ('protection') of both the Syrian and the Israeli 
states, has, thus created a unique situation in relation to the political economy of its resistance. Despite 
Israeli expropriations of land, the majority of the indigenous population remain propertied and they 
have fiercely resisted Israeli efforts to deprive them of their land and their autonomy-through-the-land. 
Indeed, the right to keep producing food from the land is dialectically related to a religious value in 
honour and autonomy. Moreover, reincarnation and the discursive mobilisation of the symbolic 
landscape, provides a powerful and legitimising political claim to the land. This claim, furthermore, is 
not contingent upon the patronage of a state; it recognises the precariousness of the state form and 
transcends spatial territorial claims through a ‘sovereignty of time.’ It is the strength of this assurance 
that the SOGH hold in the land that helps us understand how they have managed to maintain an 
emancipatory political positioning vis-a-vis both Israeli and Syrian populist strategies. Rather, then, 
than their remote topographical vantage in the mountains of the Golan Heights affording them 
security, it is precisely their stateless yet rooted (ad)vantange that allows them to remain politically 
aloof from the excesses of authoritarian populism.  
Whilst rural areas and landscapes are often mobilised ideologically in nationalist discourses, we have 
set out an argument in this paper that it does not necessarily follow that those who dwell in rural 
locations are particularly susceptible to such discourses. On the contrary, since such portrayals of the 
rural are most often set apart from ideas of the urban they work better on visitors to, and gazers upon 
such landscapes who achieve some sense of national self-realisation and a re-authenticated sense of 
returning to one’s roots (Edensor, 2002, p. 40). The SOGH, on the other hand, have no such 
unfulfilled longings and it is their very proximity and intimacy to the rural landscape that allows them 
to demystify ideological appropriations and pursue, despite the Occupation, their own emancipatory 
political agendas. 
Back in Damascus in 2009, a student from the occupied Golan Heights had told this joke: the Syrian 
moukhabarat (secret security) put two people in prison: one is a pimp, the other a revolutionary. So, 
the pimp complains to the revolutionary that his body is not free to enjoy sex. And the revolutionary 
says ‘my mind has never been more free than now in prison!’ So, there we are: the free man in jail, 
and the Syrian Druze in the Golan Heights; stifled by occupation, stateless, yet rooted and defiant. 
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